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Over the past few years theWorld Health Organization (WHO)
has been undergoing substantial reform. The immediate trigger
was a budget crisis in 2010 that spurred massive staff cuts. But
at a more fundamental level, deeper systematic changes in global
health governance havemade reform imperative.1ThoughWHO
reform draws relatively little attention outside diplomatic circles
in Geneva, at stake are critical concerns that will affect public
health everywhere.
The essential role of WHO is most often appreciated when
outbreaks of infectious disease cross borders, such as the newly
identified Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)
coronavirus, which has infected 636 people since 2012 and has
a death rate of about one in three.2 With an increasing number
of cases being reported, fears exist that it could infect thousands
of people, similar to the SARS (severe acute respiratory
syndrome) coronavirus in 2002-03.3
The international response to MERS has been more rapid than
to SARS at least partly because of global structures that have
facilitated epidemiological assessment, international information
sharing, and the development of potential treatments. In an
increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, global
rules negotiated among governments are crucial for facilitating
international cooperation and for protecting the health of the
world’s population. Sometimes adhering to these rules requires
governments to forgo some of their sovereignty and to trust an
international organisation to act impartially and independently
for the common good. One of the fundamental reasons for the
creation ofWHO in 1948 was to ensure that governments would
“compromise their short-term differences in order to attain the
long-run advantages of regularized collaboration on health
matters.”4
Althoughmany global health problems can be dealt with outside
of WHO, the negotiation, agreement, and monitoring of
compliance with global health rules can realistically take place
only in WHO’s main decision making body, the World Health
Assembly.WHOpossesses unique political legitimacy because
its membership encompasses all countries in the United Nations.
This legitimacy allows WHO to convene governments and
others (such as civil society, experts, and business) to negotiate
rules, resolve differences, and reach consensus—all key elements
of stewardship, a core function of the global health system.5
MERS exemplifies at least three areas of global rule making
that are crucial for protecting global health: rapid information
sharing on new infectious threats, fair arrangements for access
to drugs and vaccines, and research and development of
technologies and other interventions.
Rules for information sharing on
infectious disease
MERS is just the most recent illustration of the fact that states
acting in isolation cannot control the spread of infectious disease
across their borders. Global collective action is vital not only
to protect health but also to secure trade and human rights.
Global rules can help ensure prompt identification and control
of disease through an interconnected global network of
information and surveillance.
The stature and impartiality of WHO is crucial to its success in
monitoring and disseminating information. Countries need to
trust an international agency to report and use health information
impartially in the interests of public health. The revised
International Health Regulations (2005) require states to report
certain public health events of international concern to WHO
and establish procedures thatWHO and its membersmust follow
to uphold global public health security.6 WHO member states
adopted the regulations to balance their sovereign rights with a
shared commitment to prevent the international spread of
disease.
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The regulations require countries to strengthen their existing
capacities for public health surveillance and response, while
calling on higher income states to provide help with capacity
building. Here again, WHO draws on its expertise to work
closely with governments and partners to provide technical
guidance and to mobilise the resources needed to implement
the new rules effectively. The regulations do not include
mechanisms to enforce compliance, and countries do not always
fully or immediately report relevant data. But there are strong
diplomatic and political pressures to conform to global rules,
and each act of state compliance increases the normative force
on other states to do the same.
Rules for access to health technologies
in pandemics
More recently,WHOnegotiated a highly contentious framework
concerning the sharing of influenza viral samples and fair access
to vaccines and treatments in the event of a pandemic. This was
prompted by the Indonesian health minister’s refusal to supply
H5N1 virus samples toWHOCollaborating Centres for analysis
and vaccine preparation in 2007, amid concerns about an
outbreak of avian flu. She claimed that any vaccines or drugs
derived from its viral samples were unlikely to be available to
developing countries7 and invoked the principle of viral
sovereignty to defend her decision to withhold samples until a
more equitable system for access to vaccines in a pandemic
could be established.
If developing countries were to withhold viruses from WHO
Collaborating Centres, it would pose a threat to global health
security and the ongoing risk assessment for influenza. After
multiple tense negotiations, member states agreed the Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework for the sharing of
influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits in
2011. Though imperfect, the agreement balanced the goals of
improving and strengthening the sharing of influenza viruses
with efforts to increase access to vaccines and other pandemic
related supplies by developing countries.8 The framework was
adopted at the 64th World Health Assembly.
In negotiating the PIP Framework and the International Health
Regulations, WHO served as a respected international
intermediary to set vital global rules. These achievements could
happen only because of WHO’s international legitimacy,
impartiality, and technical independence. WHO also used its
position to negotiate more equitable access to other drugs.
Rules for generating innovation and
access to medicines
New research findings were recently published that identified
a compound that could potentially protect humans fromMERS
and other coronaviruses by inhibiting their replication.9 While
it is too early to draw conclusions on the effect of this discovery,
it is a timely reminder of the central importance of research for
global health. The 15 coauthors of the publication were based
at academic institutions in the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Sweden, and Germany, and the work was funded by research
institutes based in Europe and Japan. Once their results were
announced, they became a valuable global public good of
potential use to governments, drug developers, and health
workers not only in the Middle East but in all countries at risk
of infection.
However, research and development for emerging infections
and globally equitable access to drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics
remains one of the most contentious issues in global health.
Although such technologies have the potential to prevent or
treat deadly diseases, they also require costly investments in
research and development.
In the past, the governments of wealthy countries and the
multinational drug industry largely financed such investments,
with patients ultimately reimbursing the costs by paying high
prices for newmedicines. With the globalisation of patent rules
in the 1990s through the World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), it became easier for companies to charge high
prices for medicines in developing countries. As a result, drugs
were often priced at unaffordable levels and access to medicines
became a sensitive political issue. Companies now sell some
cancer drugs, for example, for prices as high as $70 000 (£42
000; €52 000) in India, where two thirds of the population live
on less than $2 a day.
Concern about access to drugs, which first drew global attention
with the HIV/AIDS crisis, prompted governments to amend
global norms on intellectual property. An addition to TRIPS in
2001 stated it “can and should be interpreted and implemented
in amanner supportive ofWTOMembers’ right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all.”10 This came after health ministers at WHO’sWorld Health
Assembly in 1996 insisted that health concerns be better
incorporated into intellectual property rules.11
WHO was also instrumental in government negotiations to
tackle shortcomings of the existing research and development
system, which too often required difficult trade-offs between
incentives for research (by keeping prices high) and ensuring
widespread access (by keeping prices low).12 The 2008 Global
Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and
Intellectual Property paved the way to explore new global rules
for encouraging, financing, coordinating, and ultimately sharing
the benefits of research and development. AWHO expert group
in 2012 recommended that governments start negotiating such
rules within a proposed global treaty.13 After yet another round
of difficult negotiations at WHO, in May 2013 governments
agreed to test new approaches to innovation that would pay for
research and development with public funds, so that costs do
not need to be recuperated through high prices. And at the 2014
World Health Assembly, governments agreed to establish a
pilot international fund to finance research and development,
mobilising public funds from countries across the income
spectrum.
Once research and development has been paid for, drug prices
can be set at the lowest possible levels (a concept known as
de-linkage, as it breaks the link between high drug prices and
research financing). WHO member states are now exploring
international coordinationmechanisms to improve the efficiency
of global research by reducing duplication and providing
incentives for rapid and open sharing of research findings, and
they are testing out some of these principles in demonstration
projects.14
WHO financing and stature
As new challenges arise that threaten health security across the
world, the independence and neutrality of WHO become even
more important. But WHO is struggling. Its core budget, which
was intended to provide guaranteed, long term, predictable
financing through assessed contributions by all WHO member
states, has atrophied. Powerful stakeholders are increasingly
funding WHO through voluntary contributions, which now
make up 80% of WHO’s total budget.15 In 2013, the Gates
Foundation and the US and UK governments were the top three
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financial contributors toWHO. Roughly five sixths of UK funds
and two thirds of US funds were channelled as voluntary
contributions, which means the country has control over how
it is spent.1 Top donors that channel a higher percentage of funds
through core contributions are Japan, Germany, and France.
Less wealthy countries rightfully question whether WHO has
become an agent for powerful countries that have clear political
incentives such as retaining tight control over the agency’s
priorities and operations for providing funding in this way.16
Because discretionary funding is given to disease specific causes
rather than to cover core normative functions such as rule
making the agency must plead with donor countries and
organisations for needed resources. Voluntary funding,
moreover, often is unconnected to the global burden of
diseases.17 In addition, countries may choose to go entirely
around the WHO through regional or small group bodies.18 For
example, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa now
convene an annual meeting of health ministers to strengthen
cooperation on issues of shared interest among the five countries,
such as technology transfer for medicine production and
universal health coverage.19
Although WHO could benefit from additional resources, the
greater challenge is that it needs a larger proportion of its budget
guaranteed. The US made the prospect of financial stability
within WHO virtually impossible by adopting a policy of zero
nominal growth— a decline in real terms—for the core budget
of UN agencies such as WHO in the 1999 Helms-Biden Act.
Amending this law and similar provisions in other countries to
allow an increase in the core budget is critical to strengthen the
independence and neutrality of WHO and requires strategic
advocacy to frame it as an important national security concern
given the agency’s importance in managing new disease
outbreaks.20 Core funding has not yet received the attention it
deserves in the US Congress and other national legislatures. In
addition, countries in arrears should be further pressured to meet
their financial obligations to WHO.
WHO is the only international agency that can broker global
rules that protect the health of all, but is badly underfunded to
perform this core function. The ongoingMERS outbreaks offer
a critical opportunity to reform WHO financing so that it can
perform its vital normative functions.
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Key messages
Recent outbreaks of MERS highlight the need for a global response to infectious disease
WHO has had a crucial role in developing rapid information sharing on new infectious threats and fair arrangements for access to drugs
and vaccines and to research and development
WHO is the only international agency that can broker such global rules but is badly underfunded to perform this core function
The MERS outbreaks offer an opportunity to reform WHO financing
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